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Boyd Hunter1
A ‘wicked problem’ is a term used in the planning literature to characterise
a complex multi-dimensional problem. The article argues that Indigenous
child abuse is one such problem. Whatever the merits of the recent federal
intervention into Northern Territory Indigenous communities, it is unlikely
to succeed without both long-term bipartisan commitment of substantial
resources and a meaningful process of consultation with Indigenous peoples.
If we are to learn from what policies worked (and what did not work), then
it is particularly important that a transparent evaluation framework be
established before undertaking policy initiatives.
The dramatic press conference of the Prime Minister, John Howard, and the
Indigenous Affairs Minister, Mal Brough, on 21 June 2007 produced a front-page
headline in the next day’s issue of the NT News: ‘Martial Law — Howard
mobilises cops, military as he declares “national emergency” in NT communities’
(Adlam & Gartrell 2007).
After intense and heated public debate over the ‘national emergency’ — and
clarification of the more controversial proposals (for example, compulsory health
checks were to be less invasive than had been feared) — three Bills were
introduced to the federal parliament on 7 August 2007, comprising 480 pages
of legislation relating to alcohol restrictions, pornography bans, changes to the
permit system and township leasing, and to the quarantining of welfare
payments.
The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill 2007 provided a
legislative framework for:
• alcohol restrictions to stem the instances of family violence and sexual abuse
of children;
• computer audits to detect prohibited pornographic material;
• five-year leases to better manage investments to improve living conditions
in townships;
• land-tenure changes to enable town camps to become normal suburbs;
1  Boyd Hunter is a Fellow at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research at The Australian
National University.
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• the appointment of government business managers in Aboriginal townships
to manage and implement the emergency measures;
• the removal of customary laws as a mitigating factor for bail and sentencing
conditions; and
• better management of community stores to deliver healthier and more
affordable food to Indigenous families.
The second piece of legislation, The Social Security and Other Legislation
Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007, combined three elements:
welfare reform specific to the Northern Territory (NT); welfare reform specific
to Cape York; and a broader welfare-reform package announced a little earlier.
The government proposed to quarantine various income-support payments and
direct Indigenous families to provide basic necessities such as food, clothing and
shelter for their children, rather than supporting substance abuse and gambling.
The third and final piece of legislation is the Families, Community Services
and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory
National Emergency Response and Other Measures) Bill 2007, which amends
existing legislation to include the imposition of bans on pornography and changes
to the permit system. Rather than the total scrapping of the permit system in all
NT Indigenous communities, as had been proposed in the original press
conference, the Bill only lifts the requirement for permits to visit Aboriginal
land in townships and access roads and airstrips.
These Bills were passed without substantial amendment on 16 August, after
a one-day review hearing in the Senate.
Wicked Problems and Indigenous Policy
The ‘wicked problem’ here does not refer to a moralising condemnation of the
inherent evil of the widespread child abuse; rather, it is a term used in the
planning literature to characterise a complex multi-dimensional problem.
Indigenous policy is one of most complex areas facing governments, as it involves
many issues that do not exist for other Australians: a dynamic cultural life; a
need to change social norms; unique forms of property rights, such as native
title; and the intergenerational transmission of disadvantage, sometimes arising
from problematic historical government interventions (such as, the ‘stolen
generation’).
The concept of ‘wicked problems’ was originally proposed by Rittel and
Webber (1973). Ill-defined design and planning problems were called ‘wicked’
because they are often messy, circular, aggressive and intrinsically complex.
Rittel and Webber contrast such problems to the relatively ‘tame’ problems of
mathematics, chess or puzzle-solving. Wicked problems have incomplete,
contradictory and changing requirements; and solutions to them are often
difficult to recognise as such because of complex interdependencies. The solution
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of one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create another, even more
complex, problem. A wicked problem is likely to be one whose solution requires
large groups of individuals to change their mindsets and behaviours.
Conklin (2003) argues that there are four defining characteristics of wicked
problems:
1. The problem is not understood until after a solution has been formulated.
2. Stakeholders have radically different world views and different frames for
understanding the problem.
3. Constraints and resources for solving the problem change over time.
4. The problem is never solved (completely).
Indigenous policy is easily characterised as a wicked problem. Obviously,
mainstream Australian society has a different perspective on the problem from
Indigenous stakeholders, who are more likely to emphasise land rights, cultural
difference and injustice. One of the main debates for the NT intervention is
whether the trade-off between Indigenous rights and socioeconomic status is
being taken into account. The existence of this trade-off means Indigenous
Australians must ‘own’ both the problem and solution (Henry 2007). If
behavioural and attitudinal change is required, then an adequate process of
consultation with Indigenous people is obviously crucial to securing their
cooperation. Imposing solutions from above is both profoundly illiberal and
unlikely to produce real solutions at all.
Further, the constraints of the problem are changing over time as community
dysfunction, sometimes fuelled by excessive alcohol consumption, enters a
negative or vicious cycle (see Hunter 2007b for a discussion of a related model
of cumulative causation).
Finally, the issues involved are extremely unlikely to be resolved completely
as the ‘modernisation project’ is partially, if not wholly, inconsistent with cultural
maintenance.
Context to NT intervention
The immediate rationale for the NT intervention was Ampe Akelyernemane Meke
Mekarle (‘Little Children are Sacred’), the Report of the Northern Territory Board
of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, which
‘distressed’ the Prime Minister and other readers. However, there have been
numerous other reports into child abuse, neglect and violence in Indigenous
communities written over many years (see, for example, Martin 1988; Memmott
et al. 2001). While the rates of child abuse are higher among all disadvantaged
groups compared to the Australian average, it is particularly high in Indigenous
communities (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2006: Table
2.8). Victoria has the highest number of Indigenous child-abuse substantiations
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per 1000 children (63.0), followed by the ACT (56.0), South Australia (43.20)
and NSW (27.1). The NT had a relatively low rate of Indigenous child-abuse
substantiations of 13.7 per 1000 children — only Western Australia (12.2) and
Tasmania (5.8) had lower rates. It should be noted that child-abuse data may be
particularly prone to measurement error as it involves an inherently difficult
and sensitive subject matter. However, it should be noted that under-reporting
of child abuse is not confined to either Indigenous communities or the NT —
indeed, the ‘Little Children are Sacred’ report specifically rejects the notion that
Aboriginal culture is the reason for the under-reporting of abuse (Wild &
Anderson 2007: p.58).
Peter Botsman argues that there is a need to put Indigenous child abuse into
perspective (2007). Indeed, the fact that substantiated child abuse among
non-Indigenous families in Queensland (13.7 per 1000) is as high as that which
provoked the NT intervention means that the problem is not confined to
Indigenous communities. Given the high level of disadvantage and poverty
identified in NT Indigenous communities, the level of substantiated child abuse
is relatively low. Obviously, policy needs to address broader issues, rather than
simply focusing on Indigenous-specific issues such as permits and land rights.
Some aspects of the intervention were foreshadowed and informed by the
Cape York Institute report (CYI 2007) — for example, the focus on quarantining
welfare payments for certain behaviour; addressing incentives to work in
mainstream jobs; and the reform of the Community Development Employment
Projects (CDEP) scheme, the long-standing Indigenous work-for-the-dole program.
Nevertheless, the government’s plan differed from the CYI report in crucial
ways. The CYI report was based more on ‘ground-up’ theory: it involved
substantial collaboration with the Indigenous community and incorporated the
direct involvement of community representatives in the proposed Family
Responsibility Community (FRC). Another difference was the fact that the
quarantining of welfare suggested by the CYI report was not necessarily
mandatory.
It became clear in the days following 21 June that there had been no
consultations with state and territory governments or local Indigenous
community elders. The lack of communication with Indigenous representatives
is largely a result of the abolition of ATSIC, as there is no longer any recognised
local Indigenous authority for governments to talk to. Even Noel Pearson was
given only 15 minutes’ warning of the government’s planned intervention
(Pearson 2007).
The public debate that followed involved heated exchanges between the
protagonists. In a sense, this is understandable since the intervention was hastily
conceived and sketchily outlined: apart from the occasional press release, there
was little to tell people what the government’s response actually entailed. Teams
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of bureaucrats and army personnel were sent into the NT to scope the issues
involved.
The heat of the public debate has scared off many people who may have had
positive contributions to make.2  Critics of the NT intervention run the risk of
being construed as supporting child abuse by default. However, if policy
interventions are misconceived and poorly designed, then the possibility of
constructing a truly effective long-term response to child abuse may be
compromised by restricting public debate to highly committed people and
organisations. The following sections outline the main criticisms of the
intervention.
War, Shame and Conspicuous Compassion
Since 2000, the government has gradually shifted its rhetoric in Indigenous
affairs to focus on a more radical agenda. During the life of the Howard
government, the analogy of war has been used routinely to describe complex
social issues (Hunter 2006). First, there were the ‘history wars’, as Henry
Reynolds, Keith Windschuttle and others fought over the technical detail and
interpretation of Australia’s colonial history. This is arguably one manifestation
of the ‘culture wars’. Then came the ‘war on terror’, following the events of 11
September 2001. Another alleged battleground is the ‘poverty war’. Given the
involvement of the military and the strident language of the protagonists, it is
not too much of a stretch to characterise the intervention in the NT as a ‘war on
Indigenous child abuse’.
While the analogy of war provides good ‘copy’ for the media, and hence has
utility for politicians, it is a singularly inappropriate term for constructing a
positive and informed debate about complex social issues. If Indigenous child
abuse and community dysfunction are wicked problems, then the
oversimplification of the issues diminishes our capacity to construct effective
policy options.
If one is serious about Indigenous policy, one needs to attempt to build a
long-term consensus rather than construct a heroic-style conflict between
competing policies — where one policy is invariably portrayed as a failure and
the other as the solution.
Sanders (2007) demonstrates how the language of failure has become
increasingly used to describe Indigenous affairs since 2004. The Howard
government has used the idea of past policy failure to introduce major new
2 There is some anecdotal evidence of this — a colleague recently presented a paper at a conference
on ‘Measuring and evaluating Indigenous service delivery’ (held in Alice Springs, 25–26 July 2007).
Attendees included federal, state and territory and local government staff, personnel from Indigenous
organisations, researchers and others. Despite the direct relationship between the theme of the conference
and the ongoing events in the NT, there was barely a mention of the national emergency by any of the
speakers (personal communication: David Martin, 6 August 2007).
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organisational arrangements in Indigenous affairs: the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) was abolished and its programs were
re-assigned to ‘mainstream’ Commonwealth departments.
Is it possible that the claims that anyone who criticises the earnest attempt
to address child abuse is a ‘nay-sayer’ or, worse, supports child abuse by default,
have left people morally conflicted and afraid to contribute to the public debate?
The over-simplification of the issues has led to an extremity of language and
arguments that militates against a reasoned analysis of evaluation of the policy
options.
Helen Hughes’ recent book, Lands of Shame, makes a direct appeal to the
shame that Australians should feel. Shame may not be an entirely inappropriate
response to the situation, but potentially it is a debilitating response that can
circumscribe public debate.
Hughes’ polemical version of history asserts that ‘homelands’ (which, note,
are never defined in the book) are the product of a socialist ‘homeland’ model
conceived by economist Nugget Coombs. She places the main blame for ongoing
disadvantage in Indigenous ‘homelands’ squarely on the shoulders of
‘exceptionalist’ self-determination policies that were implemented in such areas.
This is an inadequate account of history which ignores the fact that Indigenous
socioeconomic outcomes were coming from an exceptionally low base in the
1970s. Furthermore, Indigenous disadvantage was (and is) prominent in both
remote and non-remote areas. Many of the policy reforms proposed by Hughes
resemble the measures incorporated in the federal government’s recent ‘national
emergency’ response to child sex abuse (Altman 2007a).
My main criticism of Hughes’ analysis is that she has created the space in
public debate where the use of hyperbole is acceptable and, indeed, endorsed.
I maintain that her earlier use of the word ‘apartheid’ in describing the permit
and land-rights system is inappropriate and categorically wrong (Hughes 2005;
Hunter 2007a). If nothing else, the debate over the NT intervention seems to
indicate that the vast majority of community residents support the right to
control who enters their communal property. When respected academics engage
in emotional debates using rhetorical devices, then this sets a public standard
whereby exaggeration and categorical errors become legitimated. The Australian
has published many articles that repeat and expand on the invalid analogy of
the ‘Australian Apartheid’.
Curiously, the former Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Amanda Vanstone, in
a 2005 speech entitled ‘Beyond Conspicuous Compassion’ (Vanstone 2005), had
this to say:
Good intentions are not good enough. Indigenous Australians must be
able to expect the same range of opportunities as other Australians. No
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more cultural museums that might make some people feel good and leave
Indigenous Australians without a viable future. Continuing cultural
identity does not require poverty or isolation from mainstream Australian
society.
While Vanstone railed against ‘conspicuous compassion’, it is hard to
characterise the PM and Brough’s rhetoric as anything other than that. Indeed,
Brough stated recently that one ‘wouldn’t have a soul if one did not support the
blow-out in spending on the intervention’.
Ironically, it appears that some politicians (not to mention various academics
and media outlets) are now competing with one another to be morally righteous
and conspicuously compassionate about Indigenous child abuse. Obviously, the
public are forced to tolerate the use of rhetorical devices by parliamentarians
because politics is a ‘blood sport’, where winning the argument is more important
than the substance of the issues involved. However, if the construction of
effective policy is the goal, debate must include an array of less moralistic
perspectives.
The only way ahead is to acknowledge the complexities of the task at hand
and attempt to identify, analyse and address the most relevant issues. All
involved need to be open to the possibility that their ideas are wrong, and to
submit those ideas for rigorous evaluation and criticism.
Preliminary Evaluations and Criticisms of NT Intervention
The authors of the ‘Little Children Are Sacred’ report have been extremely
critical of the legislation. For example, Pat Anderson says that there is no
recommendation in their report that coincides with the legislation (Marr &
Peatling 2007). Mr Brough responded to this by saying: ‘I was astounded that
the report’s authors provided no recommendations designed to immediately
secure communities and protect children from abuse.’ This accusation is more
than a little unfair since a report to the NT government based on limited terms
of reference cannot assume that the Commonwealth might provide additional
resources to secure communities.
The other initiatives may have positive effects on community functioning,
and possibly even Indigenous disadvantage, but the connections of the initiatives
to child abuse have not always been demonstrated definitively. While there is
considerable evidence on what needs to be done to respond to Indigenous child
abuse — Radio National’s The Health Report presented a summary of the
evidence-based response to child abuse (Swan 2007) — the overall lack of
evidence on which to link various aspects of the intervention to child abuse is
a major impediment to constructing effective policy options.
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There are many possible criticisms of the legislation. Space constraints limit
me to focusing on just a couple. Interested readers are referred to the transcript
of the one-day Senate hearing where many of the arguments were rehearsed3
and to Altman and Hinkson (2007) who present robust criticisms of the
intervention from more than 30 authors — around half of whom are Indigenous
contributors.
Some of the most cogent criticism has come from a former Liberal Minister
for Indigenous Affairs, Fred Chaney, in his 2007 Vincent Lingiari Lecture (2007).
Indigenous people will be subject to a level of micromanagement that is
unprecedented elsewhere in Australian society. Chaney highlights the suspension
of the provisions of the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act and the interference in
Indigenous property rights as being of particular concern. He highlights how
the lack of meaningful consultation has almost guaranteed that there will be
resistance (both passive and active) to the implementation of the policy.
Frank Quinlan, Executive Director of Catholic Social Services Australia, has
argued that overseas evidence suggests that no beneficial outcomes flow from
financial sanctions unless intensive support programs are also provided. It has
also been pointed out, on the basis of evidence from US food-stamp programs,
that the new welfare rules would affect only ‘a small number’ of families (Lane
2007). Yet the fixed costs of such interventions, such as recruiting and training
case workers, and point-of-sale machines to read entitlement cards, are high
(Blank 2002). Furthermore, the fixed costs of quarantining welfare payments in
Australia are likely to be high (relative to the US) because of diseconomies of
scale.
Linking child abuse and neglect to the welfare quarantining provisions may
also have perverse consequences. Notification of abuse and neglect is often
voluntary and it is possible that there will be a decline in reported child abuse
and neglect if families are reluctant to suffer the social consequences of
welfare/income management — even if the actual incidence of child abuse and
neglect is not reduced. This is not a problem in itself, but it may have perverse
consequences to the extent that support for families in need is affected.
Few commentators would argue that restricting alcohol consumption is not
fundamental to tackling child abuse and dysfunctional Indigenous communities.
Nevertheless, the Police Federation of Australia argues that the new liquor
controls will make law enforcement difficult because there will be two competing
legislative frameworks in place: the Commonwealth’s new rules, and the existing
Territory legislation (Hall 2007). The Federation also argues that by opening up
the permit system in the larger public townships and connecting roads, law
enforcement efforts to address the ‘rivers of grog’ will become more difficult.
3  ‹www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S10473.pdf›
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Enforcement issues are critically important, as many Indigenous communities
already have bans on alcohol consumption. Prohibition is especially difficult to
enforce when there are non-Indigenous communities nearby with access to
alcohol (that is, there is an incentive for a ‘sly grog’ market to develop).
Compulsory acquisition leases in townships are a direct intervention into
Indigenous property rights. Legitimate questions have been raised about the
just-compensation provisions for the compulsory acquisition. The changes to
the permit system can also be construed as tampering with Indigenous property
rights, as many communities (Oenpelli, for example) rely on the income earned
from issuing permits.
As part of the intervention, Mal Brough also announced that all CDEP
employment in the NT will be replaced by ‘real jobs’ (Altman & Hinkson 2007:
p.331).4 While some commentators question how meaningful the term ‘real job’
is, the major unresolved issue is where these new jobs might come from and
who might finance such positions. Several NT schemes have already closed, with
a concomitant loss of governance capacity for administering community-level
initiatives. Brough had previously indicated that he wants the state to deliver
development directly to Indigenous families and individuals, thus bypassing
mediating institutions and representative structures (Altman & Hinkson 2007:
p.315). While these policy thrusts are not intrinsically inconsistent, the federal
government is likely to have difficulty in developing the organisational capacity
to deal directly with Indigenous people and their families — especially given
the problems recently experienced in hiring and retaining Indigenous employees
(Commonwealth of Australia 2006).
The most substantial criticism of the intervention is that it is an assault on
Indigenous choice and, ironically, responsibility. The NT intervention is clearly
paternalistic as it imposes a new set of constraints on what Indigenous people
can do, both inside the welfare system and elsewhere. The intervention has been
promoted on the grounds that it will assist in re-establishing norms in Indigenous
communities and hence in enhancing social responsibility. In contradistinction,
it has also been argued that depriving people of personal responsibility may not
be the best way to increase the capacities and willingness of individuals to
exercise this responsibility (Quinlan 2007).
This section has outlined some ex ante criticisms and evaluations of the NT
intervention, which may or may not turn out to be valid. Given that the
intervention is controversial and contestable, it is particularly important to
establish a credible and accountable framework for evaluating the resulting
outcomes.
4  Over the last few years, the CDEP scheme has already been scaled back in non-remote areas.
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The Importance of Ex Post Evaluations
One of the most disappointing aspects of the NT intervention is that there was
virtually no lead time to prepare or think about an evaluation framework. Some
ex ante planning with Indigenous leaders and relevant bureaucracies would have
both lessened the public resistance and facilitated evaluation. It will now be
very difficult to evaluate the outcomes of the intervention because no
groundwork was laid to establish credible benchmarks for what existed before
the policy shift.
In the United States, most major change in policy would start with a strategy
for evaluating the social experiment with random assignment (Bloom 2005).
Social experiments are regarded with particular suspicion in Indigenous policy
because they raise ethical questions about the treatment of the Indigenous
population as subjects, rather than as people. The Howard government has
clearly indicated a willingness to engage in paternalism with this intervention,
but its failure to establish benchmarks or construct control groups means that
it will be almost impossible to attribute any changes in outcomes to the
intervention. For example, the rate of child abuse and neglect in the NT may go
up or down depending upon the level of measurement error both before and
after the intervention. Consequently, the NT intervention is unlikely to be held
to account and the government can make almost any claim it wants about what
happens as a result of its policy.
Given the scale of the intervention, it would not be unreasonable to
characterise it as one of the largest social experiments in Australian history —
with NT Indigenous communities being the ‘treatment group’. Of course, the
‘experiment’ analogy breaks down when one remembers that there has been no
attempt to randomly assign people into control and treatment groups. Another
problem for the analogy is that some of the policy initiatives are not entirely
confined to the NT. Nevertheless, it is time to consider explicitly adopting a
more scientific approach to experiments in Indigenous affairs — especially since
it is, arguably, already occurring.
One potentially important advance for the evidence on the development
processes facing Indigenous children is the Longitudinal Study of Indigenous
Children (LSIC). The 2007 federal budget announced that LSIC would involve
around 1,500 babies and children from 11 regional sites. The relatively small
sample size may circumscribe the power of the analysis to discern between
competing hypotheses. Another concern is that LSIC is not national in scope
and hence can be accused of reflecting regional idiosyncrasies. One potentially
unfortunate side-effect of the NT intervention is that it may disproportionately
affect the level of cooperation of LSIC respondents there vis-à-vis other states
and territories (that is, it might induce some measure of non-sampling error).
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When LSIC data is eventually collected, it should enhance the findings from
the cross-sectional studies of the Western Australian Aboriginal Child Health
Survey (WAACHS, see Zubrick et al. 2006). While the proposed LSIC will not
be a national study, it shares this limitation with the WAACHS.
Some (Hopefully) Positive Policy Options
Indigenous disadvantage has not arisen suddenly; rather, poor outcomes for
Indigenous Australians appear to have accumulated over many generations.
While the Howard government and its supporters rightly point to historical
factors driving Indigenous disadvantage, their historical focus seems to be rather
narrowly confined to the period between the early 1970s and the mid 1990s (for
example, Hughes 2005). The quality of data was not really credible before 1981,
but Census data seems to indicate that there has been steady, though not
spectacular, improvement in certain socioeconomic outcomes since the 1970s
(Altman, Biddle & Hunter 2005). This seems like a counterintuitive finding —
but those who try to construct a narrative of failure in Indigenous policies do
not contest the national statistics on which these results are based; rather, they
claim that the failure is mostly manifest in remote outstations and ‘homelands’
(Hughes 2007). Hunter (2007a) argues that this response is inadequate as the
geographic definitions used are ill-defined and, in any case, the broad changes
in Indigenous wellbeing at the national level are largely reflected when a more
disaggregated geography is used. This is not to say that this ‘progress’ is
adequate, especially in the presence of substantial macroeconomic growth; rather,
that the extreme claims about failure and success should be tempered.
Changes in Indigenous socioeconomic status are unlikely to be achieved
without substantial commitment to providing the resources required. The
long-run trend in spending on Indigenous affairs has increased over the last 30
years. From the early 1990s, Indigenous-specific expenditure as a percentage of
GDP has stabilised at around one-third of one percentage point (Gardiner-Garden
& Park 2007). The per-capita measure of Indigenous-specific expenditure is
complicated by uncertainty about the exact size of the Indigenous population
but, given the substantial undercount of the Indigenous population (Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2007), it is entirely possible that per-capita spending
has actually fallen in the last seven years. Whatever the merits of the current
spending levels, it is worth asking whether funding has been spent in the most
effective areas.
Indigenous policy debate is challenging at a personal level for all who attempt
to engage with it. People from the left of the political spectrum need to
acknowledge the existence of incentive effects and the potential for the negative
influences of culture. The right will have to accept some role for ‘symbolic’
issues such as Indigenous rights and accept that culture and norms are more
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complex than they assume. For example, giving people a choice means having
to accept that not everybody will necessarily make the same choices.
It may be naïve to think that one can separate out the politics from the policy,
but complex problems need bipartisan and long-term policy options. Positive
outcomes are unlikely to be achieved without the cooperation of all parties, who
need to change their own (and others’) behaviour(s). It should be noted that
there are likely to be long lead times in changing behaviour and norms, especially
in the presence of intergenerational transmission of disadvantage.
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of evidence for some of the more unique
aspects of Indigenous policy, there are some things that we can do to break the
‘vicious cycle’ of Indigenous disadvantage and child abuse — even if we do not
invoke a ‘virtuous cycle’ immediately. Primary among these would be to address
the substance abuse and risky alcohol consumption with supply-side constraints.
As argued above, some aspects of the intervention may undermine the efficacy
of such policies.
Intervention into the supply of alcohol is only one policy option. Another
option would be to consider a policy which operates on the demand for alcohol.
If the price of alcohol were increased by raising excise taxes, this would constrain
the amount of alcohol consumed in Indigenous communities (that is, if demand
is not completely inelastic). This policy has the advantage that it will reduce the
consumption of alcohol throughout Australia, rather than focus solely on remote
Indigenous communities.5  Of course, this may be politically unpalatable, but
it is important to recognise that there are many negative externalities arising
from alcohol consumption for both individuals and communities throughout
Australia (including non-Indigenous communities). Given that the Prime Minister
has identified a national emergency, it might be considered an opportunity for
a truly national policy.
Learning to drink responsibly is an important element of an Australian youth’s
education (Brady 2004). Social policies that support the educational process
within schools and families will also play a role in addressing the widespread
problem of binge drinking.
Policy also needs to facilitate positive child development through funding
community infrastructure and supporting families with young children. It is
important to note that supporting families does not necessarily entail increasing
welfare payments, as these are likely to entail negative incentive effects that
work against participation in the mainstream economy (Henry 2007). Daly and
Hunter (1999) showed that many (or even most) Indigenous people would earn
less than their nominal expected welfare entitlements if they secured work. The
5  Macgregor et al. (2004) propose that local Indigenous communities be allowed to set their own
alcohol taxes. However, political and constitutional reality may work against any such policy.
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likely disincentive effects of welfare payments are likely to have been exacerbated
by the growth of generous family payments since the late 1990s. Given that it
might be politically difficult to reduce welfare payments, it is necessary to
consider the issue of conditionality of welfare payments, not unlike some of the
initiatives embodied in the NT intervention. Another approach worth considering
is to establish a more positive set of incentives for Indigenous youth to stay at
school (Hunter 2003).
Finally, it is hard to deny the historical shortfall in public investment in NT
communities, especially in areas of policing and schools (Taylor & Stanley 2005).
What is needed now is a sustained effort, community consultation and
partnership, effective and appropriate expenditure, and close monitoring by
the media of what is being achieved (Altman 2007b). The additional commitment
of resources entailed in the NT intervention aimed at ensuring security of
communities is laudable, but more is needed. It is a crisis that will now require
serious commitment over many years. Governments should not underestimate
the magnitude of the task — Jon Altman’s estimate of a $4 billion shortfall in
expenditure is extremely conservative as it only focuses on certain aspects of
the policy initiatives.
Learned Helplessness and Behavioural Change
Some commentators might be surprised how uncritical many Indigenous
community residents have been of the NT intervention, especially in the central
desert area. There are at least two possible explanations for this. The first is that
some Indigenous people are glad something is finally being done, although they
may be sceptical about the efficacy of the plan (Langton 2007). Another
possibility is that many Indigenous people are more used to having things done
to them than being active participants in mainstream society. This second
possibility underscores the major strength and weakness of the NT intervention,
which involves substantial constraints on Indigenous choices, especially in the
area of property rights and access to citizenship rights embodied in welfare.
Learned helplessness is a psychological condition in which a human being
has learned to believe that a situation is helpless (Petersen, Maier & Seligman
1995; Seligman 1975). The theory is that depression results from a perceived
lack of control over the events in life, which may result from prior exposure to
(actually or apparently) uncontrollable negative events.
Not all people become depressed as a result of being in a situation where they
appear not to have control, but the intransigence of Indigenous socioeconomic
circumstances is such that it would be surprising if many Indigenous people
had not learned to feel helpless. Prolonged exposure to dependence on welfare
is likely to be one of the major factors underlying community violence and
dysfunction (Hunter 2007b).
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The top-down approach has many limitations, especially when it is attempting
to change people’s behaviour. One of the limitations of military-style
interventions is that it perpetuates attitudes of ‘learned helplessness’ that need
to be changed if enduring changes are to be achieved. In a sense, some aspects
of the intervention will address the learned helplessness arising from the lack
of mainstream employment options. However, by bundling together more
controversial measures that alienate Indigenous communities and their property
rights, it also risks exacerbating the feelings of alienation and helplessness.
Reprise
In summary, even if one does not disagree with some aspects of the policy focus
of the NT intervention, there has been a failure to provide for adequate planning,
implementation and evaluation of the initiatives. Wicked problems, in inherently
complex domains such as Indigenous policy, require negotiation between
stakeholders and vigorous open public debate. In some ways, the public debate
has been vigorous, but many commentators have criticised the lack of
transparency and openness of the public discussions. This paper emphasises the
need for a bipartisan and long-term policy commitment so that substantial
progress can be made in addressing Indigenous disadvantage and child abuse.
While long-term commitment is essential, a transparent evaluation process is
also essential to ensure that any bipartisan policy is based on solid foundations
to achieve the desired outcomes.
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